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Abstract
The process of news consumption has undergone great changes over the past decade: Information is now available in
an ever‐increasing amount from a plethora of sources. Recent work suggests that most people would favor algorithmic
solutions over human editors. This stands in contrast to public and scholarly debate about the pitfalls of algorithmic news
selection—i.e., the so‐called “filter bubbles.” This study therefore investigates reasons and motivations which might lead
people to prefer algorithmic gatekeepers over human ones. We expect that people have more algorithmic appreciation
when consuming news to pass time, entertain oneself, or out of escapism than when using news to keep up‐to‐date with
politics (H1). Secondly, we hypothesize the extent to which people are confident in their own cognitive abilities to moder‐
ate that relationship: When people are overconfident in their own capabilities to estimate the relevance of information,
they are more likely to have higher levels of algorithmic appreciation, due to the third person effect (H2). For testing those
two pre‐registered hypotheses, we conducted an online survey with a sample of 268 US participants and replicated our
study using a sample of 384 Dutch participants. The results show that the first hypothesis cannot be supported by our data.
However, a positive interaction between overconfidence and algorithmic appreciation for the gratification of surveillance
(i.e., gaining information about the world, society, and politics) was found in both samples. Thereby, our study contributes
to our understanding of the underlying reasons people have for choosing different forms of gatekeeping when select‐
ing news.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, information is not only 24/7 available, but
also in unprecedented amounts. There are more news
outlets and stories than any human could use, from
more and more sources. To separate the “signal” from
“noise,” news is selected by humans—i.e., journalists
(e.g., see the seminal work by Shoemaker & Vos, 2009),
friends, but also people who leave similar digital traces
(for example, see Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017)—or auto‐
mated systems (i.e., algorithms, recommender systems;
for an overview, see Nechushtai & Lewis, 2019). While
scholars and pundits discuss the dangers and pitfalls of
being drawn into the rabbit hole by algorithmic news
selection (e.g., Helberger, 2020), the work by Thurman
et al. (2019) and the framework of algorithmic apprecia‐
tion (Logg et al., 2019) suggest that most people prefer
news in general to be selected by algorithmic solutions
rather than human editors.
We put forward that these seemingly opposing views
emerge because the uses and gratifications of news
(Diddi & LaRose, 2006; Katz et al., 1974; Lee, 2013;
Ng& Zhao, 2020) are lumped together. The uses and grat‐
ifications approach proclaims that “instead of studying
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what media do to people, we should be asking what peo‐
ple dowithmedia, particularly the gratifications they aim
to derive from the fare on offer” (Blumler, 2019, p. 1)
and focuses on the reasons why people tend to news—
for example to get political information (surveillance)
or to be entertained. Using algorithmic news selection
to keep up with the latest celebrity gossip or to follow
your favorite sports league is less consequential in terms
of problematic societal consequences (i.e., polarization,
fragmentation) than using algorithmic news selection for
getting information about political processes and opin‐
ions. However, especially the public discourse is still
mainly focused on the negative consequences of news
algorithms for fragmentation, polarization, and spread
of false information (Harari, 2020; Rose, 2020; Schipper,
2020; Wong, 2020). By now, it has become clear that
most of those claims are overstated (Dubois & Blank,
2018; Geiß et al., 2021)—still, the gut feeling that algo‐
rithms are “to blame for it” remains rather persistent in
academic and public discourse.
We propose to instead look more closely at people’s
preferences for news selection mechanisms and argue
that (a) gratifications for news usage coincide with pref‐
erences for news selectors, and (b) overconfidence in
one’s own cognitive ability moderates news selection
preferences.We assume thatwhen themain aimof news
consumption is surveillance—i.e., gathering knowledge,
keeping up with political news—the quality, accuracy,
and diversity of information is of rather high importance
for the user. Therefore, we expect the appreciation for
expert (human) judgment to be higher when news is con‐
sumed for this gratification compared to the other gratifi‐
cations of news usage (i.e., passing time, entertainment,
and escapism). At the same time, algorithmic solutions
of news selection mostly depend on user choices (i.e.,
past selections, friend circles). We thus propose that in
cases of overconfidence in one’s own ability to judge the
relevance of information, algorithmic gatekeepers (i.e.,
algorithms that choose which news will be presented
where and towhom) offer an easyway to get tailor‐made,
relevant content, even, or especially, when the aim of
news consumption is surveillance. The algorithm ampli‐
fies one’s own decisions—meaning that for overconfi‐
dent people it is seen asmaking “good” choices. The neg‐
ative public picture of news algorithms in this context can
rather be seen as a consequence of a third person effect
(Davison, 1983)—believing that others aremore affected
by negative consequences of algorithms than oneself.
We pre‐registered our argument (see Supplementary
Material), subsequently conducted an online surveywith
a sample of 250 US participants, and replicated our study
using a sample of 400 Dutch participants (for research
compendium, see Supplementary Material). Our expec‐
tation that people who consume news for surveillance
have lower trust in algorithmic news selection is not sup‐
ported by the data. However, when additionally includ‐
ing overconfidence in one’s own abilities in the model,
a significant positive interaction effect between the
surveillance gratification (i.e., understanding the world,
society, and politics) and overconfidence could be found.
People with high levels of overconfidence appreciate
algorithmic news selection more, the more they use
news for staying up‐to‐datewith political news, the oppo‐
site holds for low levels of overconfidence.
Our findings contribute to the understanding of the
underlying reasons people have for preferring different
forms of gatekeeping when selecting news. Despite their
bad image, algorithms mostly help consumers to make
decisions easier and faster. They thus play a larger role
when looking for news with no particular purpose. Given
the amount of information floating around these days,
algorithmic solutions to news selection seem here to
stay. Better understanding people’s motives and charac‐
teristics for news consumption, and in particular news
selectors, gives insights into what people are searching
for when selecting gatekeepers. Our pre‐registered and
exploratory analyses indicate that there is much to be
learned from looking at individual differences when it
comes to news consumption, but especially the prefer‐
ence for news selectors. This in turn plays a large role in
shaping the information environments of citizens and the
relative importance of algorithmic intermediaries—a pro‐
cess inwhich our study can deliver an important first step.
2. Causes for Concern, Yet Appreciated: The Paradox of
Algorithmic News Selection
While news consumption has always been influenced by
processes of gatekeeping, the enormous amount of infor‐
mation requires to not only selectwhatmakes it into the
news (since space limitations are far less of a concern),
but it also brings up the question of how to make a selec‐
tion. In this article, we focus on the latter. While it is
still (mostly) journalists and editors that decide whether
something happening in the world becomes a news arti‐
cle and gets written up—which certainly is a crucial part
of the gatekeeping process—the decision of what actu‐
ally appears on the front page of the online newspaper
and gets suggested to users can be done by either editors
or via algorithms.Welbers et al. (2018) showed that even
when news selection is performed by human editorial
teams, they already heavily depend on sources such as
news agencies to handle the workload. Still, in this case,
news selection resembles rather closely the traditional
way seen in printed newspapers: Experts (trained journal‐
ists) judging the newsworthiness of articles for the popu‐
lation as a whole. An increasing amount of pre‐selection
and placement on the page aswell as tailor‐made person‐
alization, however, is currently done through algorithmic
selections—“gate‐keeping no longer belongs to journal‐
ists or humans exclusively” (Nechushtai & Lewis, 2019,
p. 7). Recommender systems play important roles in the
process of algorithmic selection (Karimi et al., 2018; Ricci
et al., 2011). Like human editors, they filter information
and thereby reduce the information overload placed on
news consumers today.
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The pathways through which those algorithms select
information have been the object of scholarly and pub‐
lic debates. Algorithmic news selectors allegedly cause
“echo chambers” (Sunstein, 2009)—where only informa‐
tion that resembles one’s own world view is displayed—
and/or “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011)—where the deci‐
sions of the users (often shaped by processes of selec‐
tive exposure) involuntarily lead to a narrowing of certain
dimensions in the selected articles and especially per‐
spectives expressed in the content. Many studies have
challenged those assumptions and often found counter‐
acting results (see e.g., Dubois & Blank, 2018; Geiß et al.,
2021), still the narratives of echo chambers and filter
bubbles remain persistent and continue to draw atten‐
tion on a wide scale. At the same time, a recent study
by Thurman et al. (2019) suggests that people view algo‐
rithms as more neutral compared to editors and recom‐
mendations from friends and therefore prefer them for
their news selection. Their finding can be seen as in line
with more general work on algorithm appreciation (Logg
et al., 2019), showing that people often prefer algorith‐
mic to human judgment. Sundar (2008) also refers to
this phenomenon as the “machine heuristic,” describ‐
ing the assumption of neutrality and absence of bias in
technology and algorithms. Carlson (2019) coins a simi‐
lar phenomenon with “mechanical objectivity,” i.e., peo‐
ple assume that algorithms might be better in making
unbiased selections as opposed to humans. Thus, while
academic and public debates regarding algorithmically
curated news often remain negative, the positive per‐
ception of people regarding automated news selection
stands in contrast to it. Our article, therefore, sets out
to look into better understanding the motivations and
reasons people might have for preferring algorithms for
news selection while public and academic debate rather
should lead to a negative image. We draw on two differ‐
ent explanatory factors for diving deeper into the rea‐
sons why people might select one gatekeeper over the
other: Uses and Gratifications Theory (UGT) and epis‐
temic overconfidence.
2.1. Uses and Gratifications
UGT describes different motives people have for con‐
suming media content (Katz et al., 1974), and has been
ample times applied to understand news consumption
(see e.g., Diddi & LaRose, 2006; Lee, 2013; Ng & Zhao,
2020). The main question this theory tries to answer is:
“Why do people become involved in one particular type
of mediated communication or another, and what gratifi‐
cations do they receive from it?” (Ruggiero, 2000, p. 29).
Among the main gratifications people use for news con‐
sumption, are entertainment, passing time, escapism,
and surveillance. Additionally, answering criticisms over
the past few decades, it is also important to include the
dimension of habitual usage—accounting for the fact
that media selection is not necessarily always based on
certain (conscious) goals but often happens as part of
a routine (checking the news in the morning) without
active intentions (Ruggiero, 2000).
One important aspect of UGT is that it cannot only
be used to explain “which media to consume, but also
how to consume themedia content” (Choi, 2016, p. 250).
We draw upon this connection between gratifications
sought and the mode or pathway of accessing the news.
We expect that the reason why people consume news
drives their preferences for gatekeepers of the news.
Research on UGT so far mostly focused on looking at the
type of media (television, newspaper, online) or the spe‐
cific outlet that is chosen for news consumption (Lee,
2013). Further, some studies show that, in addition to
choosing the content or outlet, the mode of getting
access to the content can also be influenced by the grati‐
fications sought. It has been studied which gratifications
play a role in using social networking sites in general as a
pathway for getting the news (Choi, 2016), which moti‐
vations influence the usage of news aggregators (Lee
& Chyi, 2015) or using mobile phones as news devices
(Li, 2013). However, what we are proposing is to fur‐
ther abstract from different outlets or platforms towards
choosing a general mode of gatekeeping for accessing
news. This relates less to whether one chooses a news‐
paper or Twitter but rather to whether the selection of
news was made by a human or an algorithm. While we
do know that people value algorithms as a selector of the
news (Thurman et al., 2019), there are only limited stud‐
ies that we know of that connect gatekeeping decisions
(algorithms vs. humans) with UGT.
We expect that the positive sides of algorithmic news
selection—e.g., the easewithwhich you receive informa‐
tion and reduce information overload (Bozdag, 2013)—
exceed the negative sides that are mainly highlighted by
scholars—e.g., filter bubbles, polarization, etc.—for spe‐
cific gratifications more than for others. The negative
consequences highlighted by scholars are mainly about
the UGT’s surveillance domain related to political news—
learning more about events happening and keeping up
with current events. Gathering political knowledge, seek‐
ing information, and shaping attitudes towards topics
of societal relevance are the main focus of those con‐
cerns. However, a large part of news consumption is
not centered around those areas: In the Reuters News
Report, around a quarter of the US population indi‐
cated to be interested in so‐called “soft news” (enter‐
tainment, lifestyle, sports) to the same amount or even
more than in hard news (politics, economics), especially
in the younger age groups (Newman et al., 2015). Studies
in the US also show that entertainment motivations
play a strong role, especially in the online environment
(i.e., being the strongest predictor of the usage of news
aggregators, political blogs, or usage of social media for
news; Lee, 2013). For escapism, passing time, and enter‐
tainment the ease at which articles are obtained might
be more important while the stakes for the quality of
information are lower than for news sought for surveil‐
lance reasons. Especially since recommender systems
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are omnipresent and widely used in the entertainment
industry for selecting relevant movies, books, and music
(i.e., Amazon, Netflix, Spotify), the usage of algorith‐
mic curation in those areas is more widely accepted.
As Wölker and Powell (2020) showed, automated sports
news content produced by algorithms is perceived as
more credible and selected more often compared to
human‐produced content. We expect that people have
more algorithmic appreciation for news when the grat‐
ifications sought are escapism, passing time, and enter‐
tainment, compared to the surveillance domain since
gathering precise information is less important here
than fast information selection. Leading to the follow‐
ing expectation:
H1: People will show less algorithmic appreciation
for news selection when the gratification sought for
news is surveillance compared to the other gratifica‐
tions (escapism, passing time, entertainment).
2.2. Epistemic Overconfidence
In addition, we argue that the relationship between grat‐
ifications sought for news is conditional upon the confi‐
dence in one’s own cognitive ability. Typical for algorith‐
mic news selection is that the main information sources
to judge the relevance of a news article for the user are
(a) the past actions of the user, or (b) the choice of simi‐
lar people or friends. When expecting less of a negative
influence on oneself, the notion of optimistic bias (being
less vulnerable to malicious intents) has often been pro‐
posed as playing an important role (Salmon et al., 2019;
Wei et al., 2007). This has been coined the “third per‐
son effect,” which states that people tend to believe that
media “have a greater effect on others than on them‐
selves” (Davison, 1983, p. 3).
In psychological terms, the third person effect stems
from a need to show that one is less gullible to nega‐
tive effects to bolster a positive self‐concept (Kim, 2018).
One’s self‐conception as being superior to others regard‐
ing the gullibility of negative effects can be seen as
one main driver of the third‐person effect. This directly
relates to the notion that people overestimate their own
capacities and ability to judge the relevance of informa‐
tion (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). The phenomenon hasmostly
been explored by economists and psychologists as the
Dunning‐Kruger effect (Dunning, 2011). In this study, we
opt for another term, epistemic overconfidence, since
it relates to not being able to estimate one’s cognitive
capabilities correctly. Therefore, we use people’s ability
for cognitive reflection (“epistemic overconfidence”) as
a moderator to explore individual overconfidence differ‐
ences (“third person effect”) for the effect of UGT on
algorithmic appreciation.
H2: The more epistemic overconfidence people dis‐
play, the more algorithmic appreciation they show
when the news gratification is surveillance.
3. Data, Measurement, and Methods
To examine how people’s expected gratifications of
news are connected to the selection of different news
gatekeepers, we have fielded an original survey with
AmazonMechanical Turk (MTurk) for the US participants.
We have collected data from 268 participants. From
the work of Coppock (2019), we know that MTurk sam‐
ples can be skewed in terms of people’s party identities.
We had no a priori expectations about people’s party
identities and their preference for algorithms. Yet, we
had 19 respondents (7%) not answering the question.
Because this question is asked last in the survey, we will
run the statistical tests with and without these respon‐
dents, to see if that influences the robustness of the
results. In the remainder of our sample, 116 respondents
(43%) identified as Democrats, 70 respondents (26%)
identified as Republican, 55 respondents (21%) identi‐
fied as Independent, and 8 respondents (3%) identified
as “something else.” We grouped the latter two options
into the category “Other,” comprising of 58 respondents
(22%), see Figure 4 for the distribution. In addition,
we have fielded the same survey with Pollfish to col‐
lect 348 Dutch respondents (Pollfish works similar to
MTurk, but has enough Dutch participants). The devi‐
ation in number from the pre‐registered report (see
Supplementary Material) is because of 19 people drop‐
ping out of the party ID question. Our research com‐
pendium with open materials and more information is
available in the Supplementary Material. Our data is
fairly balanced regarding gender: 275 respondents (42%)
identified as female, 377 respondents (58%) identified
as male. The distribution, split up for the two countries,
is visualized in the left panel of Figure 4. Regarding age,
our sample has a mean age of 35, with a standard devi‐
ation of 12.59. This indicates that 95% of our sample is
between 18 and 60 years old, with the oldest participant
being 74. The distribution of age in our sample is visual‐
ized in the middle panel of Figure 4.
In our study, we aim to explain people’s apprecia‐
tion for algorithms when selecting news (exact word‐
ing can be found in Appendix A in the Supplementary
Material). To do so, we asked people to rank order sev‐
eral gatekeepers: (a) traditional editorial teams, (b) algo‐
rithmic selection based on your past reading behavior,
(c) algorithmic selection based on the behavior or pref‐
erences of your friends or people who are similar to
you, and (d) being the gatekeeper themselves. This oper‐
ationalization made a specific distinction between two
forms of algorithms (one based on past‐read content,
one based on similar users), staying in line with differ‐
ent types of news recommendation algorithms currently
being used (i.e., content‐based and collaborative). Since
most people do only have a vague sense of what algo‐
rithms are and based on what information they oper‐
ate this explanation was added. In the future, it might
be good to strike a better balance between the cat‐
egories by adding similar qualifiers for the traditional
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editorial teams to not make it seem as if they pick out
news at randomcompared to algorithms.Weasked them
to rank them for the four substantive dimensions of
news gratifications: (a) to keep up to date with polit‐
ical news (Surveillance); (b) to escape from daily wor‐
ries (Escapism); (c) to kill time (Pass Time); and (e) to
entertain myself (Entertainment). As described in our
pre‐registered report (see Supplementary Material), we
re‐coded the ranking variable with 1 if the algorithms
options were ranked first, and 0 otherwise. The used
scale in the analysis ranges from 0 to 4, where 4 indi‐
cates one ranked the algorithms options first for all
four news gratifications, 3 indicates one ranked the algo‐
rithms options first for three out of four news gratifi‐
cations, 2 indicates one ranked the algorithms options
first for two out of four news gratifications, 1 indicates
one ranked the algorithms options first for one out of
four news gratifications, 0 indicates one ranked the algo‐
rithms options first for none of the four news gratifica‐
tions. The mean value of this scale is 1.92 (SD 1.43), with
75% of the observations between 1 and 3. This means
that on average, people placed an option with algorith‐
mic selection in the first place for two of the gratifica‐
tions, with some even for three dimensions. Figure 1
shows the distribution. On the x‐axis, algorithmic appre‐
ciation is approved and on the y‐axis the percentage of
respondents in each category is displayed.
To explain algorithmic appreciation for news selec‐
tion, we asked people about their news gratifica‐
tion. We measured this using the scale of Diddi and
LaRose (2006). This scale consists of five dimensions:
Habit strength, Surveillance, Escapism, Pass Time, and
Entertainment. For each of the 23 items, the respon‐
dents were asked on a 7‐point Likert scale to what extent
people thought a statement on news consumption was
applicable to them, ranging from 1 (not at all applicable)
to 7 (very much applicable). In the next step, we used a
principal components factor analysis using varimax rota‐
tion, similar to Diddi and LaRose (2006). Each dimension
itself has a high level of reliability: (a) Entertainment con‐
sists of 2 items with a Cronbach’s 𝛼 of 0.77; (b) Escapism
consists of 5 items with a Cronbach’s 𝛼 of 0.85; (c) Habit
Strength consists of 4 items with a Cronbach’s 𝛼 of 0.84;
(d) Pass Time consists of 5 items with a Cronbach’s
𝛼 of 0.87; (e) Surveillance consists of 7 items with a
Cronbach’s 𝛼 of 0.85.
Figure 2 shows the distribution for each dimension
for news gratification. On the x‐axis the 7‐point scale
for each news gratification is displayed, and the y‐axis
shows the percentage of respondents in each category.
All gratifications have means showing that the major‐
ity of respondents thought they apply to them, with
surveillance being the most sought‐after gratification
(Entertainment: M = 3.91, SD = 1.73; Escapism: M = 3.59,
SD = 1.65; Habit Strength: M = 4.31, SD = 1.60; Pass Time:
M = 3.83, SD = 1.65; Surveillance: M = 4.78, SD = 1.37).
In general, respondents in the US sample had higher val‐
ues at the end of the scale, andDutch samples had higher
values at the start of the scale.
Our study explores the mechanism of the third per‐
son effect driving the relationship between gratifications
of the news and algorithmic appreciation. For that rea‐
son, we have used a moderator. As described in the the‐
ory section, the third person effect, in this case, is con‐
ceptually close to what is also called epistemic overcon‐
fidence (e.g., see Kim, 2018; Salmon et al., 2019; Wei
et al., 2007). We measured epistemic overconfidence
using a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) based on the scale
developed by Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) com‐
bined with the three standard CRT questions of Toplak
et al. (2011). The 7 questions have high face validity,
and, in order to address some criticisms of the origi‐
nal CRT, do not require a high degree of mathematical
sophistication to generate the correct answer. After the
CRT we asked respondents to estimate how many ques‐
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Figure 1. Descriptive information of the dependent variable. Notes: Mean = 1.92; SD = 1.43.
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Figure 2. Descriptive information of the independent variables.
those that are overconfident give more intuitive (and
thus false) answers while estimating that they have all
or the majority of the questions correct. To measure
epistemic overconfidence, we subtracted the number
of correct answers people think they had given on the
CRT to the actual number of correct answers. This could
range from −7 (respondent answered all questions cor‐
rect but estimated that none were correct) to 7 (respon‐
dent answered none of the questions correct but esti‐
mated that all were correct). Hence a higher number indi‐
cates higher levels of epistemic overconfidence, and 0 is
the actual middle point (number of questions correctly
estimated). On average, people overestimate their capa‐
bilities by 2 questions (M = 2.48, SD = 1.96), with 75%
of the respondents ranging from slightly overestimating
their capability (score of 1) to overestimating their capa‐
bilities by 4 questions (score of 4). The sample is slightly
skewed towards people being overconfident, especially
the majority in the Dutch sample was slightly overconfi‐
dent (score of 2).
In our analysis, we controlled furthermore for
Frequency of News Usage, Political Efficacy, and Trust
in Media (see our online compendium for the visual‐
ization in the Supplementary Material). First, we mea‐
sured Frequency of News Usage by asking respondents
on an 8‐point scale (0 being never and 7 being every
day) how many days of the week they consume news in
5 different ways. The additive scale of the 5 items has a
Cronbach’s 𝛼 value of 0.71. On average, people consume
news on approximately 4 days of the week (M = 3.79,
SD = 1.63). Second, wemeasured Political Efficacy (lower‐
left panel in Figure 4) using a combined knowledge and
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efficacy seven‐point scale, ranging from1 (completely dis‐
agree) to 7 (completely agree). The additive scale of the
3 items has a Cronbach’s 𝛼 value of 0.57. On average,
people have a high level of political efficacy (M = 4.41,
SD = 1.28)—this is especially driven by the participants of
the US sample. Third, wemeasured Trust inMedia by ask‐
ing respondents how much they (dis)agree with 9 state‐
ments regarding various gatekeepers on a seven‐point
scale, ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (com‐
pletely agree). The additive scale of the 9 items has a
Cronbach’s 𝛼 value of 0.85 (M = 4.91, SD = 1.10).
To test our hypotheses—i.e., whether algorithmic
appreciation is dependent on the gratification of the
news (H1) and whether that relation is moderated
by epistemic overconfidence (H2)—and to conduct
exploratory analyses, we use OLS regression analyses
(Bryman, 2016).
4. Results
4.1. Which News Consumers Prefer Algorithmically
Curated News?
In this section, we start by exploring the bi‐variate rela‐
tionships between algorithmic appreciation and gratifi‐
cations of the news. Figure 3 shows the level of algorith‐
mic appreciation (Y‐axis)—0 equals never the preferred



















































Figure 3. Bi‐variate relations between algorithmic appreciation and gratifications of the news.
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each gratification (X‐axis). The black solid line depicts a
LOESS smoothening (locally weighted smoothing) to visu‐
alize the relationship between the two variables. The yel‐
low area surrounding the line is the 95% confidence
interval. As the panels for Entertainment (upper‐left),
Escapism (upper‐right), and Pass Time (middle‐right) of
Figure 3 demonstrate, the relationship between these
gratifications of the news and algorithmic appreciation
is linear and negative. This means that the more you
use news to entertain yourself, out of escapism, and/or
to pass time, the less likely you are to appreciate an
algorithmic gatekeeper (i.e., rank one of the two algo‐
rithmic news selections first). The middle‐left panel of
Figure 3 shows that there is no relationship (or a slightly
positive one) between Habit Strength and Algorithmic
Appreciation. The lower‐right panel of Figure 4 shows
that for Surveillance, the relationship is actually positive,
but not linear: Meaning that the more you use to keep
up‐to‐datewith politics, themore often you rank an algo‐
rithmic gate‐keeper first, except forwhen you use surveil‐
lance as a gratification all days of the week. This posi‐
tive relationship is surprising and actually the opposite
of what is hypothesized. Based on the theory, we had
hypothesized thatwhen the gratification sought for news
is surveillance people will show less algorithmic appreci‐
ation (see H1).
To see whether this contradictory finding holds
while controlling for other variables, we conduct an
OLS regression. Figure 4 visualizes the regression effects,
the full model is displayed in Model 1 of Table B1 in
Appendix B (see Supplementary Material). As Figure 4
below shows, the news gratifications dimensions
Escapism, Entertainment, and Passing Time have a neg‐
ative, yet statistically insignificant, effect on Algorithmic
Appreciation after controlling for all the other variables—
Entertainment is significant on a 10% 𝛼‐level. Habit
Strength and Surveillance have a positive effect on algo‐
rithmic appreciation, with both of thembeing statistically
significant on the 10% 𝛼‐level. This indicates opposite
results for our H1, which stated people show less algo‐
rithmic appreciation for news selection when the gratifi‐
cation sought for news is surveillance compared to the
other gratifications. None of the control variables have a
statistically significant effect on algorithmic appreciation.
We do see that on average, the US sample has higher lev‐
els of algorithmic appreciation than the Dutch sample.
In a second step, we interact gratifications of the
news with epistemic overconfidence. In line with the
recommendations of Brambor et al. (2006) and Holbert
and Park (2019), we calculate and visualize the pre‐
dicted effects and standard errors (𝛼‐level of 0.05%)
in Figure 5. The full models are displayed in Model 2
till Model 6 of Table B1 and B2 in Appendix B (see
Supplementary Material). Figure 5 shows that for the
dimensions Habit Strength and Surveillance for the over‐
confident respondents, the more they use these gratifi‐
cations for news sought, the higher levels of algorithmic
appreciation they have. The opposite holds for insecure
respondents. These interactions are statistically signifi‐
cant on the 10% 𝛼‐level. We originally had preregistered
the interactions to be considered significant at the 5%,
yet the authors’ growing awareness of statistical power
in interactions (e.g., Franzese & Kam, 2009) led us to
deviate from the pre‐registered plan and report the 10%
𝛼‐level as support for our second (H2). For the dimen‐
sions of Entertainment, Escapism, and Passing Time, we

















Figure 4. Predicting algorithmic appreciation.







































































Figure 5. Predicting algorithmic appreciation for different levels of epistemic overconfidence.
4.2. Exploratory Relationships
To explore individual differences for appreciation of
news selectors, we look at the role of gender in the
relationship between overconfidence and algorithmic
appreciation. Moreover, we look at how general trust
in media coincides with appreciation for news selectors,
and whether our proposed relationships in H1 and H2
also hold for the other types of news selectors.
4.2.1. Gender
While insufficiently powered to slice up the sample
once more, Figure C1 in Appendix C (se Supplementary
Material) demonstrates that patterns for female (left‐
handpanel) andmale respondents (right‐handpanel) are
similar. Hence, the effect of H2 is not driven by (fe)males
being more overconfident.
4.2.2. Trust in Media
Themain analysis reported in Figure 4 demonstrates that
the higher levels of generic trust in media, the lower
the levels of algorithmic appreciation. Looking at the
bi‐variate relationships between news selectors (X‐axis)
and trust in media (Y‐axis), Figure 6 demonstrates that
for journalistic and algorithmic appreciation (top‐left
and bottom‐left panel) the relationship is curve‐linear.
People with no and high levels of appreciation have
lower trust in media. Most likely people who have high
confidence in the journalistic system still prefer experts
and journalists as gatekeepers compared to algorithmic

















Appreciaon for News Selector
Let journalist choose news for me
4.75
10 2 3 4
4.50
4.25
I select my own news
4.8




Let journalist choose news for me
4.7
10 2 3 4
4.5
4.3
Figure 6. Bi‐variate relations between news selectors and trust in media.
solutions. Additionally, there seems to be a group that
has low levels of trust in all of the news selector options
presented (traditional media or algorithms)—a group
that likely proves to be interesting in the context of alter‐
native media and sources.
When this bi‐variate relationship is tested while con‐
trolling for additional variables in a regression analy‐
sis, Figure 7 (see also, Table C1 of Appendix C in the
Supplementary Material) shows that for an 𝛼‐level of
10%, compared to people who appreciate algorithmic
news selectors, people who like to select their own news
have higher trust in media. The same holds for people
with higher levels of overconfidence. This exploratory
result demonstrates that the role of overconfidence, or
the third person effect, is potentially important to under‐
standing how people think about news and particularly
the ways in which the news is selected.
4.3. Other News Selectors
Lastly, we explore the relationship between UGT and the
appreciation of other news selectors—the models can
be found in Appendix C in the Supplementary Material.
Figure 8 demonstrates in the left‐hand panel that for
the UGT dimension Surveillance, there is a positive rela‐
tionship between preferring to select your own news
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Figure 7. Predicting trust in media.
and using news for keeping up with politics. This indi‐
cates that themore you use the news to keep up‐to‐date
with political information, the more you like to select the
news yourself (significant at the 10% 𝛼‐level). The rela‐
tionship between UGT dimension Escapism and select‐
ing your own news as preferable is negative: The more
you use the news for the gratification Escapism the less
you prefer to select the news yourself (significant at the
10% 𝛼‐level). The other dimensions center around 0, indi‐
cating no effect. For appreciation of journalistic (human)
UGT: Surveillance
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Figure 8. Predicting appreciation for other news selectors.
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selectors, the right‐hand panel of Figure 8 shows that for
the UGT dimension Surveillance and Habit Strength that
themore you use the news as a strong habit and for keep‐
ing up with politics, the less you appreciate journalistic
news selectors. You do have appreciation for these news
selectors when the gratifications sought for are Passing
Time, Escapism, and Entertainment.
Looking at the moderation of overconfidence for
both other news selectors, Figure 9 shows that for
respondents with high levels of overconfidence, they
appreciate journalistic news selection less when using
news more often for surveillance gratifications (bottom‐
left panel). Figure 10 demonstrates that overconfidence
does not play a role for people who appreciate to
self‐select the news. Across all dimensions of UGT the
patterns of insecure and overconfident respondents
are similar.
5. Discussion
In this article, we investigated to what extent appreci‐
ation for algorithms as news gatekeepers is influenced
by gratifications sought. We furthermore proposed that
this relation is dependent on people’s overconfidence
in their cognitive abilities. Our analysis of 652 partici‐
pants demonstrates that the gratifications the news is
sought for matter for which gatekeeper people prefer
for the selection of news articles. The main analysis
(reported in Figure 6 and Table B1 in the Supplementary
Material) demonstrates that the gratification of habitual





































































Figure 9. Predicting journalistic appreciation for different levels of epistemic overconfidence.
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Figure 10. Predicting appreciation for self‐selecting news for different levels of epistemic overconfidence.
news usage has a significant positive influence on algo‐
rithmic appreciation. This unexpected result might indi‐
cate that routine processes and frequent usage of news
might depend to a larger extent on algorithmic gatekeep‐
ers than when news is consumed for other (more con‐
scious) reasons. Algorithms mostly help consumers to
make decisions easier and faster, thus they play a larger
role when looking for news with no particular purpose.
We hypothesized that when the main aim of news con‐
sumption is surveillance, the quality, accuracy, and diver‐
sity of information is of rather high importance for the
user, calling for relying on expert judgments (i.e., journal‐
ists) for determining what is relevant. In contrast, when
news consumption is aimed at passing time, entertain‐
ment, and escapism, getting information easier, faster,
and more specifically targeted might play a larger role.
Therefore, the appreciation for expert (human) judg‐
ment should be higher when news is consumed for
surveillance gratifications while for the other gratifica‐
tions algorithmic gatekeepers are preferred. The results
actually demonstrate the opposite: The more you con‐
sume news to pass time, escape from daily worries, or
for entertainment, the less likely you are to prefer algo‐
rithmic news selection. However, for surveillance gratifi‐
cations (keeping up with politics), algorithms are rather
appreciated than feared. Two alternative explanations
for those results come to mind: On the one hand, peo‐
ple get their news for passing time, escaping, or enter‐
tainment from platforms where they are less aware of
the algorithmically curated processes (e.g., social media)
or from preferred websites where the expert curation is
key. Especially when it comes to entertainment, getting
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new and surprising content that possibly deviates from
what was consumed before might be an added bonus.
On the other hand, it might be that when the stakes
are high (forming your political opinion) algorithms are
seen as more “neutral”—in line with the machine heuris‐
tics, such that they can be trusted to not be influenced
by anything other than the facts. This is of course a
grave misconception of the nature and workings of news
algorithms—depending on the (biased) data sources the
algorithm was trained on and the design of the algo‐
rithm (what is it optimized for), algorithms can lead to
biased or non‐diverse sets of news recommendation.
However, this conception might, especially in a polar‐
ized media environment, lead to more trust in an algo‐
rithm than in a journalist. Indeed we can see in our
exploratory results that a negative relationship between
using news for surveillance reasons and having a journal‐
ist as gatekeeper can be found. A general distrust in the
media system and journalists to deliver “unbiased” news
might bring people to rely even more on algorithmic
gatekeepers when important information is concerned.
Journalists can be trusted with the “soft side” of the
news, but are seen as skeptical when it comes to provid‐
ing political information.
Our second finding showcases that users with high
levels of confidence in their own abilities are more
likely to prefer algorithmic gatekeepers for surveillance
gratifications, as we expected in Hypotheses 2. Highly
confident—or overconfident—individuals might rather
prefer to have a system that learns from their own deci‐
sions instead of having other people (i.e., journalists)
decide upon their news consumption. The notion of algo‐
rithms being more “neutral” (as part of the machine
heuristic), seeing themas passive amplifiers of one’s own
thoughts, might appear especially appealing to those
estimating their own cognitive abilities as high. When
expecting less of a negative influence on oneself, the
notion of optimistic bias (being less vulnerable to mali‐
cious intents) has often been proposed as playing an
important role (Salmon et al., 2019; Wei et al., 2007).
Therefore, one’s self‐conception as being superior to oth‐
ers regarding the gullibility of negative effects can be
seen as one main driver of the third‐person effect.
While this small, and low‐powered, study has given
us some proof of concept for the puzzle of why peo‐
ple might prefer algorithmic news and at the same time
fear a polarized and “filter bubbled” society, there are
several limitations. First of all, the MTurk and Pollfish
samples are not representative samples of the US and
Dutch populations. In other words, we have to be care‐
ful when interpreting results. Moreover, while an inter‐
action effect is able to give some indications for the
mechanism underlying algorithmic appreciation, more
evidence needs to be brought to the table. This will also
involve looking more in detail at good measurements of
preferences for gatekeepers—howmuch information do
people get about the kind of gatekeepers (human or algo‐
rithmic) they can select from? In this study, we added
additional explanations for the algorithmic gatekeepers
to show based onwhich data selections could bemade—
which already seems to imply a specific reasoning going
beyond what human editors are doing. In how far the
“motives” of selecting certain news should be included in
the items or even systematically varied should be further
explored, especially regarding the influences on trust‐
worthiness or objectivity evaluations of the gatekeeper.
This study showed that in the context of gatekeeper
preference often the question is less what specific con‐
scious reasons people have to search for news but rather
whether they follow habitual patterns instead of search‐
ing for particular gratifications. Given the cognitive load
of more and more information, leaving the hard work
of pre‐selection to algorithms will likely gain in impor‐
tance. However, we also showed that when users have
specific goals in mind for their news search, different
patterns of gatekeeper preferences occur—being mod‐
erated by variables such as confidence in one’s own
abilities, but also possibly related to trust in the media
system. This opens two interesting avenues for future
research: Firstly, understanding more about the relation
of habitual usage and the use of algorithms as gatekeep‐
ers (algorithmic filtering as routine). Secondly, tapping
into the gatekeeper decisions users make when they do
have a specific purpose for their news search in mind
and are thus possibly more likely to pay closer attention
to the information they find. The exploratory analyses
demonstrate that in order to better understand the pref‐
erence for news selectors individual characteristics play
an important role. Our study gives preliminary insights
into this process.We argue that to better understand the
relationship, more and higher‐powered studies need to
be conducted.
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